Introduction
Corruption is a persistent problem in the world today. This is not only true for developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, but also for many European democracies such as Italy and Greece (for an overview see Holmberg, Rothstein & Nasiritousi 2009 ). In the academic field of Public Administration and in national debates in several countries it has been suggested that corruption can be curbed by fostering a traditional organization of public administration, guaranteeing lifelong careers, formalizing recruitments, and introducing strong legal protection for civil servants. This paper scrutinizes these suggestions and demonstrates that they are merely myths of corruption prevention.
The consequences of widespread corruption for economic development and social well-being are important in several ways. For example, factors related to corruption seem to be more decisive than traditional variables in economics for explaining sustained economic growth (Hall & Jones 1999; Mauro 1995; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 2004) . In addition, corruption has dramatic effects on social well-being as it contributes to worse educational attainment, lower levels of health and happiness, worse protection of the environment, impoverishment of social and political trust and higher levels of violence (Holmberg, Rothstein & Nasiritousi 2009 ).
Therefore, the quest for finding institutional recipes to curb corruption has become a goal for many researchers and policymakers.
Policymakers and academics have, for example, suggested that institutionally isolating public administration from politicians' interferences curb corruption. A group of characteristics that have received attention are some fairly narrowly defined components of a Weberian bureaucracy such as formalized recruitments of public servants, lifelong tenure and special employment laws for public employees.
i A common denominator of these bureaucratic features is that they aim to create a clear separation of the activities between public servants and politicians and, therefore, they have tended to go hand in hand.
The result is that we have some countries with more isolated bureaucracies than others. In studies mainly of OECD countries, scholars have noted a division
between the "open" (e.g. US, UK and the Netherlands) and the "closed" civil service systems (e.g. France, Belgium and Spain) (Auer, Demmke and Poltet 1996) . Politicians in more "closed" civil service systems have limited discretion to manage public employees, although they often develop large bodies of politically appointed advisors instead (Peters & Painter 2010 ). Staff policy is in these countries often firmly controlled by autonomous administrative corps of civil servants, with recruitments made through formal examinations and life tenure guaranteed for those who pass those exams (Bekke & Van der Meer 2000; Heady 1996) . In the more "open" civil service systems of Sweden, UK, Netherlands or Finland, public employees do not enjoy special employment laws, life tenure is less frequent, and public employees resemble their private-sector counterparts more.
Before moving on, a word of caution is in order regarding this classification of national bureaucracies. As Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2012) show, characterizing public administrations as closed or open is mainly meaningful for
Western and post-communist countries. In other parts of the world these different aspects of staff policy do not cluster together in the same way as in Europe. This paper therefore treats the four components of an isolated bureaucracy, for which measurements are available, separately (these are salaries, recruitments, tenure and employment laws).
This paper makes two contributions. First, we argue that one should make a distinction between two different ways in which politics and administration can be isolated from each other. Different arrangements can separate careers of politicians and administrators, or separate their activities. We explain why one should expect different effects on corruption, depending on which of these arrangements is dominant. Another paper in which both authors of this paper have participated (Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell 2011) shows a systematic positive effect of arrangements separating careers. In particular, that study notes a strong and significant effect of meritocratic recruitment to the administration, which is robust to stringent controls, such as the inclusion of the most prevailing institutional explanations like the form of government or the characteristics of the electoral system.
We do, however, know less about the effects of separating the activities of politicians and administrators, which leads us to the other, and maybe most important contribution of this paper. The paper empirically analyses the effects on corruption of four characteristics associated with administrations that separate the activities of politicians and administrators, using a unique dataset based on a survey covering the administration structure of 97 countries. The empirical analysis demonstrates that these characteristics are not linked with low corruption, as traditionally alleged by the defenders of a closed bureaucracy.
The policy implications are thus relevant for any government interested in tackling systematic corruption: unlike the frequent interpretation of a Weberian bureaucracy as one that establishes a "stark line" between the activities of politicians and administrators, we claim that that stark line should instead be established between their careers, making difficult for bureaucrats to become elected politicians and vice versa.
ii
The bureaucratic dinosaur is back
There is a long list of explanations for corruption levels and the quality of public institutions resorting to differences in cultural values, economic development or political institutions (for an overview see Holmberg, Rothstein & Nasiritousi 2009 ). In the empirical section we will include one indicator from each of these as control variables. However, the main contribution of this paper is not to offer a comprehensive explanatory model. Instead, our focus is on scrutinizing an explanation that has gained attention from both academics and policy makers, namely the institutional design of public administration.
The first generation of explanations concentrated mostly on cultural factors. Weber's (1978) well-known theory of Protestant work ethics and Banfield's (1958) theory of "amoral familism" in Southern Europe are both classical examples of culture-based explanations for understanding the divergence performances of countries.
Also more recent studies, focusing on differences in quality of government, have underlined the importance of cultural or religious values (e.g. Putnam 1993; La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000; Treisman 2007 ).
These studies do however present problems that encourage more institutional approaches. First, cultural factors are difficult to falsify, and, as some authors have noted, it is not intellectually satisfying to argue that people act in a corrupt fashion simply because they lack morals (Erlingsson, Bergh & Sjölin 2008, p. 600) .
Second, even the most sophisticated empirical analysis showing that Protestant countries exhibit lower levels of corruption fail to provide causal mechanisms (La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2007) . Third, cultural explanations of corruption and quality of government suffer from the problem of reverse causality. One cultural factor often considered key for explaining good institutions is the degree of generalized trust, or social capital, especially after Putnam's (1993) influential study of the differences between Northern and Southern Italy. As recent theoretical and empirical developments suggest, the direction of the causation could however be the other way around (Rothstein & Stolle 2008) .
This is also the problem of authors -such as Welzel and Inglehart (2008) -emphasizing the importance of economic development for understanding why some democracies perform better in terms of governance. In sum, we will control for the main cultural variable according to the literature (i.e. the degree of "Protestantism"), the level of economic development in the empirical analysis (GDP), together with the most explored political factor (i.e. the level of democracy in a country).
The main focus of this paper is, however, the public administration structure, which is a factor traditionally overlooked by the literature on corruption.
Recent studies have provided increasing evidence pointing towards the importance of bureaucratic institutions vis-à-vis the conventionally examined political institutions for understanding corruption differences (Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell 2011; Rauch & Evans 2000; Olsen 2006 (Hall 1963; Olsen 2008) .
In this paper we focus on one core principle of a Weberian bureaucracy, namely the idea of separating the political sphere from the administrative sphere within public organisations. iii This principle was the corner-stone of the British NorthcoteTrevelyan Report of 1853, which is considered as the founding text of the modern meritocratic administration in the western world (Mouritzen & Svara 2002, p. 3) . iv For the purpose of this paper it should be noted that already at that point in time these reforms aimed at tackling the extensive corruption, patronage and nepotism, in Britain known as "Old Corruption".
The separation between politics and administration is also of essential concern for the two authors most frequently cited in the literature on administrative systems, namely Max Weber (1978) , who underlined the necessity of having a civil service that was politically independent, and Woodrow Wilson (1887) , who advocated the establishment of a separate sphere for public administration. The idea of a strong bureaucracy that acts as a counter-weight to the power of a democratic majority is also prevailing in the current scholarship. Garry Miller (2000, p. 325) concludes for example that "in order to be efficient (...) governments should establish mechanisms which constrain, and not only facilitate, popular democratic control over the bureaucracy".
Separating activities or careers?
In spite of the consensus about the beneficial effects of separating politics and administration, it is much less apparent how administration and politics should be separated and what effects the different ways of institutionalising such a separation have. Very schematically, politics and administration can be separated in two different ways, which potentially can produce very different outcomes. We call it (i) the separation of activities and (ii) the separation of careers.
We will use the example of the main administrative figure in Western local governments to illustrate the difference between the separation of activities and the separation of careers because this figure travels well and has been subject to some Going beyond local governments, and looking at the general organization of public administrations in 52 countries, Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2011) argue that making professionals who respond to different chains of accountability work close together, creates a coordination problem in case they want to engage in corrupt activities. This means that when elected politicians are accountable to the party and public managers are accountable to professional peers have less margin for opportunistic behaviour. According to the same study, public administrations with such characteristics are empirically associated with low levels of corruption.
Keeping different career interests in the two groups of professionals (politicians and bureaucrats) at the apex of leadership of a local government, or, more generally, of any public administration is thus a deterrent of power abuse or corruption.
In other words, the antidote against corruption and malfeasance in public office is to have individuals with different interests jointly taking the same decisions.
Four ways of separating the activities of politicians and administrators
Paradoxically, most policy recommendations for curbing corruption through administrative design do however not aim at creating a separation of the careers of politicians and bureaucrats but rather separating their activities. In short, politicians should monopolise decision-making activities while bureaucrats isolated from politicians' interferences should monopolize policy-implementation. The former should not get involved in the activities of the latter and vice versa. This paper identifies four widespread recommendations aimed at separating activities of politicians and bureaucrats that will subsequently be tested empirically.
The first recommendation is that a traditional public management organization does consolidate a more effectively isolated bureaucracy than a New Public Management (NPM) organization, since the latter is based on the idea that politicians may introduce incentives (e.g. performance-related payments instead of flat salaries) to make bureaucrats more accountable to their wishes. A prevailing argument in the literature on corruption is that NPM reforms open windows of opportunity for corruption. This would happen even in countries with high levels of quality of government. As Erlingsson, Bergh and Sjölin (2008, p. 595) argue regarding Sweden (although they admit that "hard empirical data do not yet exist"): "our conclusion is that there are reasons to suspect that retrenchment initiatives and organizational reforms over the latest two decades, often labelled 'new public management', have increased the risk of corruption". The basic idea behind this suspicion is that the principle of legality is the ruling principle in the traditional public management organisation, while the principle of efficiency takes priority in a more NPM-oriented public sector (for a review of the literature on Spanish corruption cases, see Lapuente 2009 ). It is argued that the greater flexibility associated with NPM reforms and lack of administrative procedures that guarantee the principle of legality create opportunities for partial and/or corrupt policy decisions. For instance, a politician who wants to favour cronies in public procurement may create NPM-based agencies that more directly accountable to her.
The other three recommendations steam from the idea that careers in the public sector should be isolated from private market flexibilities in order to create the best opportunities for impartial implementation of policies. Public jobs should therefore follow a "closed" system in contrast to the "open" or "position-based" public administration system. In such systems recruitments, careers and exits of public employees are firmly controlled and often formalized (Bekke & Van der Meer 2000; Heady 1996) . At the other end of the continuum in more "open" public administrations (Auer, Demmke & Poltet 1996) the public sector resembles the private sector more.
Scholars have noted the importance of career stability for how organizations work. In Gary Miller's (1992) Managerial Dilemmas the beneficial effects at medium-long term of strategies based on long-term employment commitments are shown. Yet, authors defending the "closed" civil service system go a step further in demanding almost total guarantees of job security in what, de facto, becomes life tenure for public employees. This is a key characteristic of the civil service status granted to the bulk of public employees in the "closed" administrative model (e.g. the funcionario or fonctionnaire). For some administrative scholars, the closed public administration system would obey to a more sophisticated conception of civil service than the open system because it involves life tenure and a step-by-step promotion based on seniority.
In addition, civil servants achieve a maximum knowledge of the organization (Gutiérrez Reñón 1987, p. 66).
The positive views of a closed public administration system are common in the European academia. For instance, the German autonomous public administration system is considered a "guarantor of the public good" (Goetz 2000, p. 87) The argument for an isolated bureaucracy with firmly regulated recruitments, careers and exits in the public sector is thus that they limit the ad hoc flexibility of private-sector-like contracts. The three main mechanisms to keep public employment as "public" as possible would be: recruitment via anonymous formal examination systems which eliminate the subjectivity (and thus, the opportunities for nepotism) that the private sector-like conventional procedures (e.g. screening of CVs, face-to-face job interviews) allow; a guaranteed secure tenure, which prevents political superiors from removing inconvenient public employees; and special labour lawsdifferent from the general labour laws covering private sector workers -protecting public employees and limiting the possibilities for punishing public employees by firing them.
In sum, four hypotheses can be derived from this view of a Weberian bureaucracy as separation of politicians and bureaucrats: (i) The first hypothesis is that NPM oriented public sectors are associated with higher corruption levels.
(ii) The second hypothesis is that formal examinations when recruiting public employees are associated with lower corruption levels. (iii) The third hypothesis is that lifelong careers for public employees are associated with lower corruption levels. (iv) The fourth hypothesis is that the existence of special employment laws for the public sector is associated with lower corruption levels. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to the empirical test of these four hypotheses.
Method and data
In the empirical section we investigate the relationship between four ways of creating a separation of activities between politicians and public administrators (traditionally organized public sector, formalized recruitment to the public sector, lifelong careers and special labour laws for the public sector) on the one hand and corruption on the other, in 97 countries around the world. The method we use is very straightforward. We start by looking at simple correlations between the four indicators and levels of corruption, illustrating the relationships with scatterplots. We carry on by employing cross-section OLS with a minimum amount of control variables. We include three control variables in the regression from the spheres discussed in the theoretical section; one cultural (Protestantism), one political (level of democracy) and one economical (log of GDP per capita). On the independent side we use a unique comparative data set on the structure of public administration. The data is produced by the Quality of Government survey (from here on the QoG-survey). This is a country expert survey completed by 973 public administration experts from a total of 126 countries. The data has been We use four different indicators from the QoG-survey, one for each of the four hypothesis described in the previous section. The first, the NPM orientation of the public sector, is measured through a question where experts rank the degree to which salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals of their performance, on a scale from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). Table 1 reports the exact wording of all questions used in this paper.
Although NPM is a broad concept including much more than performance-related pay for public sector employees, it should be uncontroversial that performance-related pay is a core element of NPM, as it exemplifies a new component in rewarding systems not present in traditional public administration (Dahlström & Lapuente 2010; Peters & Hood 2004; Thompson 2007) . The degree of performancerelated pay in the public sector should thus give a good indication of the degree of NPM. The second indicator we employ relates to how commonly used formal examinations are when public sector employees are hired, again going from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). The third indicator is a question on how frequent it is that one stays as a public sector employee for the rest of one's career once recruited, again measured from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). The fourth indicator comes from a question relating to the regulation of public employees. More specifically, it asks if public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a very large extent). taken from the Quality of Government data set (Teorell et al. 2010 ).
Effects of separation of activities
A prevailing argument in the literature on corruption is that NPM reforms open windows of opportunity for corruption, and that a traditionally organized public sector has stronger legal mechanisms and more routines for preventing corruption ( If we move from aggregate data and look at some specific countries, we find illustrative examples of the relatively counter-intuitive result that public employment systems that are more similar to the private sector are not more prone to generate corruption. For instance, while face-to-face interviews belong to the standard repertoire of selecting public employees in a country like Sweden (a country with high CPI score), it has traditionally been rejected as a method for recruiting public sector employees in Spain (a country with a lower CPI score). When the Spanish administration needs to fill a vacancy the standard procedure is the publication (in the official administration's bulletin) of detailed lists of desired characteristics of the would-be civil servants (and the respective points assigned to each characteristic).
Unlike the Swedish procedure (theoretically more prone to subjective considerations), the formalized Spanish mechanism may lead to some -although hard data is unavailable to confirm it -abuses. For example, some heads of administrations, in order to favour their preferred candidate, simply insert some very specific qualifications in the legal job description published in the administration's Boletín Oficial. These practices of bending the formal exam in favour of a preferred candidate are, obviously, very difficult to uncover, let alone to prove before a court that a special requirement for a particular post was meant to favour a given candidate. Nevertheless, some scholars and civil society organizations have listed many striking cases that point towards an intention for nepotism and power abuse. For example, for theoretically standard managerial jobs, some official requirements have included bizarre conditions such as "knowing how to ride a horse" or "having been manager of a ceramics factory" (Iglesias 2007, p. 124) . This example points out that also formal recruitment systems are possible to manipulate, which would explain why they are not an effective protection against corruption.
The third hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the length of career tenure for public sector employees and the Corruption Perceptions Index. Here the basic idea is that a secure position for public employees makes them more autonomous and therefore less dependent on politicians. Some scholars have suggested that a secure position creates an Esprit de Corps within the agencies that hampers corruption (Rauch & Evans 2000) . First, characteristics of an isolated administrative organization could support each other and only produce the expected effects when they do so. Second, it is possible that the expected effects only occur at higher levels of development or in different parts of the world. In order to check the robustness of our results, we have re-run all regressions with an additive index of the four indicators as the independent variable (first objection) and divided the sample into four subsamples of OECD/non-OECD-countries and EU/non-EU-countries (second objection). There are no substantial changes of the result when we use the additive index (results not shown). When we divide our sample into sub-samples the results change in two interesting ways. Both speak against the expectation in the literature and strengthen our results. In the OECD sample the positive (non-expected) effect of performance-related pay is statistically significant on the .10-level, and the negative (non-expected) effect of career stability is statistically significant on the .05-level (results not shown). Since we have a minimum of controls and only observe significant results in one of our sub-samples, we are however unwilling to draw any conclusions from these unexpected effects.
To sum up, we have been able to contradict the expectations when it comes to the effects of an isolated administrative organization on the levels of corruption. We have used four different indicators of bureaucratic isolation and none of them have shown a statistically significant association with corruption in the expected direction.
Separate careers, but not separate activities
It is often stated that the public sector should be protected from politics and that an isolated bureaucracy, in this sense, is less prone to corruption. This paper has tried to uncover the relationship between four characteristics of an isolated public administration and levels of corruption across the world. It has previously been suggested that i) so-called NPM reforms should introduce more opportunities for corruption; ii) that a formalised recruitment system to the public sector should curb corruption; iii) that long career tenure for public employees should curb corruption; and iv) that strong employment laws for the public sector should limit corruption. Using a dataset including 97 countries around the world, we have tested these hypotheses. In sum, we show that there is no empirical association between any of these characteristics and low corruption.
We believe that two mechanisms explain why isolating the activities of the administration is not an efficient tool for curbing corruption. It is plausible to assume that, no matter what external controls decisionmakers are subjected to, they will always enjoy a margin of manoeuvre for corrupt activities. The reason being that it is logically impossible to eliminate the residual -i.e. the opportunity for personal or partisan advantage -that is a part of all policy decisions (Miller & Hammond 1994) . The decision-maker always enjoys at least some opportunities for taking advantage at the expense of social welfare derived from their informational advantages (e.g. how much a bridge -and all its feasible alternativesreally costs). Similar also to organizational economists (Miller & Falaschetti 2001) , this paper considers that it is key to create a relative (not absolute, since it would lead to complete gridlock) coordination problem among decision-makers to minimize the probabilities of opportunistic behaviour. We argue that the separation-of-careers model creates such a coordination problem, because we have agents responsive to two different chains of accountability (professional peers in the case of bureaucrats; and party fellows in the case of elected officials) forced to jointly take policy decisions.
Instead of creating a coordination problem, closed administrations actually solve the problem by dividing politicians and bureaucrats into two independent -and internally coherent -groups assigned to distinct tasks. The decision-making falls exclusively in the hands of politicians and policy implementation in the hands of bureaucrats. In a closed administration, bureaucrats are, at best, "external legal checks" for politicians' decisions. For example, in Spanish local administration, the chief administrative officer, the secretario-interventor reviews politicians' decisions (e.g.
granting a public contract to a private provider) and checks if the formal legal requirements have been met. Yet, within the limits of the existing legal framework, local politicians have a wide margin to take their most preferred policy decision (e.g. to which private contractor to benefit). In this context, individuals with shared interests (e.g. elected politicians of a given party) unilaterally set the level of the "residual" and who will eventually benefit from it.
In our view the most promising solution is to force people with different interests to take decisions involving residual, as in open public administrations. This is, for example, the case in local governments in Continental and Northern European countries where unelected bureaucrats are involved in active policy-making together with elected officials. In the more "open" public administrations the "residual" is thus in the hands of two types of officials (elected and bureaucrat) who respond to different chains of accountability (the party and the bureaucrat's professional network). As a result, favouring some particular citizens or firms, violations of the impartiality rule, and other corrupt activities are less likely when individuals with different interests must take policy decisions jointly.
There is also empirical evidence showing that arrangements consistent with the separation of careers principle curb corruption. This idea is directly tested in Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2011) and that paper shows that the critical factor separating good performing administrations from poorly performing ones is how the selection of public employees takes place: if merit trumps personal and political connections, the probability of curbing corruption hugely increases.
Judging from the results presented in this paper and in related papers, policymakers and others interested in reducing corruption through administrative design should aim for reforms separating the careers, but should not have too high hopes when it comes to the effects of reforms separating the activities of politicians and administrators. Comment: Questions are from the QoG-survey (see Dahlberg et al. 2011; Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell 2012) . *** significant < .01-level
